

# EMERGENCE OF TAMADAW GOVERNMENT IN 1962: ANALYZING HISTORICAL TRAJECTORIES AND LESSONS FOR PEACE

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## Abstract

The 1962 military came to power in Myanmar marked a significant turning point in the country's history, leading to decades of military rule. This paper aims to analyze the underlying reasons for taking power, examining the political, economic, and international factors that contributed to the military's decision to seize power. The analysis will be drawn on historical references and scholarly works to provide a comprehensive understanding of this significant historical event. This paper aims to explore the complex interplay of political and economic factors that led to the 1962 military power takeover in Myanmar. By examining the historical context and the motivations behind the power takeover, the study seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of why the military seized power and how this action reshaped the country's future.

**Keywords:** political, economic, international factors, taking power, military power

## Introduction

The 1962 military came to power in Myanmar marked a pivotal shift in the country's political landscape, transitioning from a parliamentary democracy to the Revolutionary Council. This event was orchestrated by General Ne Win and the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), leading to over five decades of military rule. The power takeover not only altered Myanmar's governance but also had profound implications for its socio-economic and international relations. Understanding the underlying causes of power takeover is crucial for comprehending Myanmar's contemporary political challenges and historical trajectory.

## Objectives

- To analyze the political and economic conditions in Myanmar prior to the 1962 military came to power, including the challenges faced by the parliamentary government
- To examine the role of key political figures, including General Ne Win
- To assess how economic instability and nationalist sentiments contributed to the came to power justification
- To explore the impact of institutional weaknesses and ideological factors on the military's decision to seize power

## Research Questions

- What were the primary political and economic conditions in Myanmar leading up to the 1962 military came to power?
- How did the weaknesses and challenges of the parliamentary government contribute to the military's decision to seize power?
- What were the immediate and long-term impacts of the 1962 military came to power on Myanmar's political structure and governance?
- In what ways did the 1962 military came to power shape the trajectory of Myanmar's subsequent political movements?

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## Research Method

**Historical Analysis:** This study will utilize primary and secondary historical sources, including official documents, personal memoirs, and contemporary news reports, to reconstruct the political and economic conditions leading up to the came to power.

**Documentary Review:** Examination of archival materials such as government records, military communiqués, and international diplomatic correspondence will be essential to understand the internal and external factors influencing the came to power.

**Qualitative Research:** The research will include an analysis of Myanmar's 1962 came to power.

**Thematic Analysis:** Thematic analysis will be employed to identify and categorize recurring themes and patterns related to the causes and consequences of the came to power.

## The Causes for Military Came to Power

During World War II (1939-1945), Burma transitioned from British rule to Japanese occupation in 1942. Consequently, General Aung San established the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) during the Japanese era on 23 August 1944, at his residence in Yangon.<sup>1</sup> The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) included the Burma National Army<sup>2</sup>, the Communist Party, and the People's Revolutionary Party. Shortly after its formation, they changed their name to the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, often abbreviated as "*Pha Hsa Pa La*". On 26 December 1945, the Myanmar Alin newspaper described the abbreviation "AFPFL". The AFPFL Conference was held on 17 January 1946, at Shwedagon Pagoda with the aim of strengthening unity.<sup>3</sup> The political parties and organizations that attended the conference are as follows.<sup>4</sup>

1. Communist Party of Burma
2. Socialist Party
3. *Myochit* Party (Patriotic Party)
4. Karen Central Organization
5. Arakan National Congress
6. Burma Muslim Congress
7. Karen Youth Organization
8. All-Burma Youth League
9. All-Burma Trades Union Congress
10. All-Burma Peasants' Union
11. All-Burma Teachers' Association
12. Women's Leagues
13. People's Volunteer Corps
14. Mon Association

<sup>1</sup> Tin Naing Toe, *Myanmar Naingnganye Thamaing Hmattam (1897-1948)* (Myanmar Political History (1897-1948)), Yangon, Sanadi Literature, 2012, p. 400 (Henceforth: Tin Naing Toe, 2012)

<sup>2</sup> On 15 September 1943, the Burma Defense Army (BDA) changed its name to the Burma National Army (BNA). *Tatmataw Thamaing 1842-1945* (History of the Tatmadaw 1824-1945), Vol. 1, Military History Museum and Office of the Military Archives, Myanmar Alin Printing Press and Guardian Press, 1994, p. 293

<sup>3</sup> Ludu U Hla, *Thatinsarmyar Ka Pyawtae Sitpyi Myanmar Pyi* (Myanmar after the war as reported by the newspapers), Vol. 1, Mandalay, Ludu Press, 1969, pp. 270-271

<sup>4</sup> Hugh Tinker, *Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944-1948*, Vol. 1, England, Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd., Thanet Press, 1983, p. 617-622 (Henceforth: Tinker, 1983)

15. Burma Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Shan, Chin, and Karen attended the event. On 7 May 1946, a public protest was held at Kantawmin Park, led by the AFPFL.<sup>1</sup>

On 21 September 1946, Governor Sir Hubert Rance met with General Aung San, President of the AFPFL. During the AFPFL executive meeting held on 25 September 1946, at 4:00 p.m., it was decided that Aung San and members of the AFPFL be participants in the Governor's Executive Council (Ministry). However, the Communist Party expressed concerns about this decision, considering it an entry into an imperialist trap that would hinder the freedom struggle and betray the people. The Socialist Party also demanded the expulsion of the Communists from the League with the rule of AFPFL<sup>2</sup>. Despite General Aung San's reluctance to remove the Communist Party from the AFPFL, no resolution was reached. Eventually, on 20 October 1946, the Communist Party was expelled from the AFPFL by a majority vote in the Central Executive Committee.<sup>3</sup> Since then, there have been disagreements between the AFPFL and the Communists. This conflict is believed to be the starting point for the breakdown of national unity in Myanmar's history. Additionally, it is one of the factors that led to military rule in Myanmar after independence.

Under the leadership of the AFPFL, Myanmar gained independence on 4 January 1948, through the Aung San-Attlee Treaty and the Nu-Attlee Treaty.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, forty-three political party organizations emerged during the era of parliamentary democracy after the declaration of independence.<sup>5</sup>

After Myanmar gained independence, U Seinda (from the People's Liberation Party) and Bonpauk Thar Kyaw (from the Red Flag Communist Party) engaged in armed conflict in Rakhine Division. Their actions continued until a parallel government was established.<sup>6</sup> The Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the Communist Party (Burma/ Red Flag) engaged in clashes. While the forces opposing the AFPFL government occasionally disagreed and launched attacks, they also cooperated in their opposition to the AFPFL, which they considered a common enemy. A delegation from the BCP, led by Thakin Than Tun, participated in the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India held in Calcutta, India from 28 February to 6 March 1948. In response to any Communist aggression, the AFPFL government declared that the Communists would face retaliation twice as strong, involving two million Red Army troops.<sup>7</sup> The Burma Communist Party convened the second national conference of the Burma National Peasants' Union from March 13 to March 18, 1948, in the village of Ahlyinlo<sup>8</sup>, Pyinmana Township.<sup>9</sup> On March 28, 1948, the Burma Communist Party launched an armed rebellion against the AFPFL government. Within days, the party became well-organized and armed, leading to movements in various areas

<sup>1</sup> Toe Tat Yae Journal, no. 25, July 1946, p. 9

<sup>2</sup> According to AFPFL rules, every member party within the federation has the right to freely criticize, but expressing criticism through external newspapers is forbidden.

<sup>3</sup> Kyaw Win, *Myanmar Naingganyee Laylarsansitchat (1948-1988)* Case Study of Myanmar Politics (1948-1988), Yangon, Tagaung Sarpay, 2022, p. 92

<sup>4</sup> Yebaw Thit Maung, *Pyitwin Thaungkyanhmu Thamaing* (History of Internal Insurgency), Part (2), Yangon, Kyayhmon Press and Guardian Press, 1990, p. 1 (Henceforth: Thit Maung, 1990ii)

<sup>5</sup> Record of Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), Union Election Commission, Computer typescript, no date, no press, Appendix (2) (Henceforth: Record of AFPFL)

<sup>6</sup> Bonpauk Thar Kyaw, *Taw Hlanye Khayeewei* (Revolutionary journey), Yangon, Pathein Press, 1975, p. 308

<sup>7</sup> Thein Pe Myint, *Tawhlanye Kala Naingganyee Atway Akyone* (Political Experiences During the Revolution), Yangon, Pathein Press, 1976, p. 211

<sup>8</sup> It is located 2 miles and 3 furlongs southwest of Pyinmana.

<sup>9</sup> Sagaing Han Tin, *Lonwa Lutlat Thoe* (Towards Totaly Independence), Yangon, PBA Color Press, 1967, p. 117

including Bago, Taungoo, Pyinmana, Myingyan, and Sagaing. Initially headquartered in the Taung Nyo region of Pyinmana, the party later relocated to Leway Township in January 1949.<sup>1</sup>

After Myanmar gained independence, certain organizations<sup>2</sup> were already engaged in armed uprisings. On 3 February 1948, the KNU group requested that the AFPFL government establish a separate Karen state. Subsequently, on 11 February, the KNU organized and led a large demonstration, showcasing the strength of the Karen people.<sup>3</sup> On 28 March 1948, the Burma Communist Party launched an armed rebellion against the AFPFL government, based in the Taung Nyo region of Pyinmana.<sup>4</sup> To solve such political problems, U Nu formulated a peace policy.<sup>5</sup> However, representatives of the Communist Party of Burma and some leaders of the People's Comrade also drew up the Comrade Principle in parallel with U Nu. On 10 July 1948, the People's Comrade League withdrew from the AFPFL after the split between Nu-Mu (U Nu's Policy) and Yebaw-Mu (Comrade's Policy).<sup>6</sup> After that, Minister of the Interior U Kyaw Nyein (Socialist) intervened and arrested Comrade White on 29 July 1948. Consequently, Major Po Kun, along with some leaders and Comrade white, went to underground.<sup>7</sup>

After the independence of Myanmar, the Mon people started striving for a separate state. The Mon Ethnic Association was led by Mon U Po Cho, and the Mon Independence League was led by Nai Ba Lwin (also known as Naing Shwe Kyin). Mon nationals in Mawlamyine held a meeting on 20 March 1948 and demanded a separate Mon state. On 23 April 1948, the Mon National Defense Association was established during a Mon ethnic conference held in Phaok Village, Mudong Township. Bengali Muslims also wanted to create a Muslim region in the Buthidaung-Moungdaw region of northern Rakhine. As a result, the Mujahideen armed group formed and rioted, and from 7 October 1948 to 12 November 1948, they surrounded and attacked Buthidaung.<sup>8</sup> The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO), which was formed on 16 July 1947<sup>9</sup>, took over the Taungoo administration on 27 January 1949. On 2 February 1949, Insein was captured. The KNDO resisted for 111 days (from 31 January 1949 to 22 May 1949) in the Battle of Insein. On 21 February 1949, the KNDO captured Meikhtila, seized two planes, captured Maymyo (Pyin Oo Lwin), and captured Mandalay on 11 March 1949.<sup>10</sup> Because of this, the AFPFL's power was limited to Yangon, so it was even called the 'Rangoon government.' The Burma Communist Party, People's Volunteer Organization, and Underground Force formed the People's Democratic Army on 24 March 1949. After that formation, they occupied the

<sup>1</sup> U Kyaw Nyein, *Myanmar Naingnganyee (1948-1958)* (Myanmar's Politics (1948-1958), Yangon, Department of Historical Research and National Library, Books Publication Committee, 2019, p-19 (Henceforth: Kyaw Nyein, 2019)

<sup>2</sup> Red Flag Communist Party (Hpyarpon), Red Army under the Communist Party (Pyinmana), Rakhine Red Army (Thandwe), Bonpauk Thar Kyaw's Rakhine Youth Association (Southern Rakhine), Mujahideen Armed Forces (Northern Rakhine)

<sup>3</sup> Thit Maung, 1990ii, 3

<sup>4</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2019, 19

<sup>5</sup> Thit Maung, 1990ii, 13

2, Part (2), Yangon, Department of Historical Research and National Library, Books Publication Committee, 2021, pp. 16-17 (Henceforth: Kyaw Nyein, 2021b (ii))

<sup>7</sup> U Nu, *Tar Tay Sanaythar* (Saturday's Son), Yangon, Ngatoe Sarpay, 2013, p. 316 (Henceforth: U Nu, 2013)

<sup>8</sup> U San Tun Aung, *Kyunnote Thithaw Mujarhit, Mayyu Myay Hnit Rohinjar* (The Mujahid I Know: Mayu Land and the Rohingya), Yangon, Moyway Press, 2018, pp. 60-91

<sup>9</sup> Fu Ki Do (Robert Zan), *Mann Bazan and the Karen Revolution*, Yangon, Independent Karen History Research Association, 1993, p. 75

<sup>10</sup> *Tatmataw Thamaing* (History of the Army), Vol. 4, Yangon, News and Press Printing House, 1996, p. 34

territory of the Mawbi Army near Yangon.<sup>1</sup> The rise of such insurgent groups became one of the factors that planted the seeds of martial law (Military Administration) in Myanmar after its independence.

Facing internal unrest, the Kuomintang White Chinese troops in southern Yunnan invaded Burmese territory at the end of 1949. In February 1951, the Burmese Army launched the Frastos Operation and Lakhun Pen Operation against the Chinese White Camps stationed in the northern “Wa” area and the eastern part of Theinni, forcing them to retreat. Consequently, the Burmese delegation presented the issue of the White Chinese invasion to the 7<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of the United Nations in April 1953. Regarding that proposal, the Myanmar government received support from sixty countries in the United Nations, with fifty-nine votes in favor and 1 abstention, for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops invading Myanmar’s territory.<sup>2</sup> However, as the White Chinese troops did not comply with the decision of the Bangkok Conference held on 22 May 1953, to hand over Mineset, Minetong, Mineyang, and Mineyong, the military launched operations.<sup>3</sup>

The Shan Armed Forces came into existence when Sai Nui formed a group of brave Shan youth called Noom Suk Harn on 21 May 1958, at the Thai-Myanmar border.<sup>4</sup> From 1 October 1955 to 31 March 1956, the AFPFL government opened the way for the insurgents to abandon the path of armed conflict and live in peace.<sup>5</sup>

As for the economic sector, rice yields were reduced, making it impossible to export as much as expected. Additionally, taxes could not be collected due to the situation, and insurgents ransacked government treasuries, resulting in a loss of public funds. In response to the deteriorating financial situation, it was decided to reduce the number of employees by 25% and cut salaries in half. Furthermore, due to the actions of the terrorists, public property such as railways, bridges, and government buildings worth 25 crores and more than 448 crores of public property was lost.<sup>6</sup> The value of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1938-39 was 5,337 million kyats, but by 1950-51, it had decreased to 3,690 million kyats. If it looks at the value of per capita, it was 326 kyats in 1938-39, but only 199 kyats in 1950-51. Additionally, the value of products exported and sold abroad was found to have decreased by 6,882 million kyats between 1950-51 and 1955-56.<sup>7</sup>

According to the economic surveys of the Government of Myanmar, between 1949-50 and 1955-56, the agricultural and fishing industries lost 1,884 million kyats worth of products. Similarly, the timber industry lost 2,838 million kyats worth of products. The metallurgical industry lost 3,450 million kyats worth of products, and the transportation business lost 228 million kyats.<sup>8</sup> Since independence, Myanmar has not been able to fully restore the rule of law

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<sup>1</sup> Record of AFPFL, 120-121

<sup>2</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2019, 63

<sup>3</sup> (a) U Nu, *Luhmu Sipwa Meintkhunmyar Paungchoke (U Nuei Meintkhunpaungchoke Ahmat-2)* (Collection of Socio-Economic Speeches (Collection of U Nu's Speeches No. 2)), Yangon, Seikku Cho Cho Press, 2017, p.237-242 (b) Hugh Tinker, *The Union of Burma*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, 53

<sup>4</sup> (a) Thit Maung, 1990ii 176-179

(b) Kyaw Nyein, 2021b (ii), 306

<sup>5</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2019, 180

<sup>6</sup> Ye Tin, “Nyeinchanye Baetaunee” (When Will There Be Peace?), *Hanthawaddy Newspaper*, 1 August 1960, p. 6

<sup>7</sup> The wounds of the insurgency, DR 1784, Defense Service Museum and Historical Research Institute, Nay Pyi Daw, p 13 – 14 (Henceforth: The wounds of the insurgency)

<sup>8</sup> The wounds of the insurgency, 16-17

due to armed rebellion, the financial crisis in 1954-55, the lack of supervision and management systems for state-owned business organizations, the lack of skilled personnel to supervise projects, and the demoralization of employees due to the centralized management system. These factors have caused the performance and standards of state-owned business organizations to be low. It appears that Prime Minister U Nu clarified the losses.<sup>1</sup>

Another factor that led to martial law was the split in the AFPFL. On 12 June 1956, U Ba Swe (Socialist) became the Prime Minister. U Nu took the position of AFPFL chairman and planned changes in positions to clean up the AFPFL without consulting anyone.<sup>2</sup> After planning to clean up the AFPFL, the disintegration of the AFPFL started again. On 29 April 1958, U Nu, the chairman of the AFPFL, announced his confession to the country in a broadcast about the conflicts within the AFPFL.<sup>3</sup> Then, on 3 May 1958, an executive meeting was held at Prime Minister U Nu's residence. U Nu presented a seven-point policy<sup>4</sup> to resolve the conflict. The leaders of both sides agreed to the proposal and assigned a four-member committee<sup>5</sup> to consider how to divide the name of the AFPFL. Since then, the Nu-Tin group and the Swe-Nyein group have been divided. Initially, three groups were merged into one under the AFPFL. However, due to differences in policy and personality, they split up and found themselves divided again, even when their strength was weak. Such a division has led to a change in the political situation of Myanmar.

The Clean AFPFL, led by U Nu, continued to maintain state power but faced political instability and armed insurgencies between 9 June 1958, and 27 October 1958. Additionally, during the reign of the Clean AFPFL government, there was mutual suspicion and anxiety between the military and the Clean AFPFL government.<sup>6</sup> In this way, on 28 October 1958, General Ne Win was nominated as Prime Minister and handed over state power. Then, in accordance with Article 56(2) of the 1947 Constitution, the President announced on 27 February 1959, that eleven ministers were appointed as members of the Union of Myanmar government under the leadership of General Ne Win as the second Caretaker Government. The Caretaker Government announced on 19 December 1959 that general elections would be held on 6 February 1960. On 1 April 1960, the caretaker government led by General Ne Win handed over power to the Clean AFPFL, who won the election.<sup>7</sup>

After that, the People's Hluttaw approved the proposal to amend the constitution under the government of the winning party, Clean AFPFL. Even before the Constitution Amendment Committee was formed, the Shan State Government held a meeting on 7 November 1960, in Taunggyi to discuss the amendment of the Constitution. In June 1961, a multi-people conference took place in Taunggyi, during which they strongly demanded the federal principle. They even

<sup>1</sup> Myat Thein, *Economic Development of Myanmar*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, p. 14-48

<sup>2</sup> Win Tint Tun, *Ahmaung Kyarka Bamar Pyi* (Burma Between Darkness), Human Society New Democratic Party (Information Department), 2007, p. 178

<sup>3</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2021b (ii), 231

<sup>4</sup> U Nu ei Kyaynyarchat, "U Nu's Declaration", *Bamakhit Newspaper*, 7-5-1958, p.7,19

<sup>5</sup> Prime Minister U Nu, Deputy Prime Ministers U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein, and Thakin Tin

<sup>6</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2019, 160 - 175

<sup>7</sup> (a) U Kyaw Nyein, *Myanmar Yetsin Thamaing (1945-1948)* (History of Myanmar Chronology (1945-1948)), Vol. II, Part (3), Yangon, History Research and National Library Department, 2021, pp. 1, 32-34, 49 (Henceforth: Kyaw Nyein, 2021b (iii))

(b) *1958-1962 Myanmar Politic*, Vol. II, Yangon, Department of Historical Research and National Library, Publications Committee, 2022, p. 425

threatened to leave the Union if their demands were not met.<sup>1</sup> At the Union Cabinet meeting held on 13 February 1962, the Constitutional Amendment Bill on the Federal Principle and the Appointment of State Chairman was not presented to the People's Assembly on 15 February.<sup>2</sup> On 24 February 1962, a meeting of State leaders (Proper and State) took place at the new radio station on Pyay Road. During this seminar, Minister of State and Unity Organization Chairman Sao Khun Cho introduced the federal principle, which received support from U Tun Myint of Shan State.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, concerning the federal principle, a document drafted secretly by one of the States to secede from the Union was presented to Prime Minister U Nu on 28 February 1962, by U Kyaw Nyein, the Vice Chairman of the AFPFL. The document asserts that if the federal principle is not implemented, the State in question will break away from the Union and align with the SETO group.<sup>4</sup> Simultaneously, the question of whether Rakhine and Mon should establish a separate State arose once again.<sup>5</sup>

In this way, U Nu's Pa Hta Sa (Union) government exploited the weaknesses of the capitalist parliamentary democracy system and the immaturity of the people, causing the Myanmar populace to deviate from the socialist path and instead look forward to the development of the capitalist system. Ultimately, this led to the threat of the Union's disintegration. Thus, Myanmar reached a point where it faced multiple crises due to political corruption, economic decline, administrative misconduct, law and order failure, and lack of security. During this period, as the Federal Principle of State separation continued, the country's situation became the worst and most complicated. Consequently, on 2 March 1962, the Revolutionary Council, led by General Ne Win, seized state power and continued to govern the country under the name of the Revolutionary Council Government.

## Findings

### Political Instability and AFPFL Governmental Weaknesses

1. **Inefficiency:** The parliamentary government led by the Union Party (AFPFL) faced significant issues of administrative inefficiency. These problems undermined public confidence and led to political instability.
2. **Factionalism:** The political landscape was marked by factionalism and infighting within the AFPFL, which weakened the government's ability to address pressing national issues and maintain stability.

### Economic Challenges

1. **Economic Decline:** Myanmar experienced economic decline during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Issues such as declining agricultural productivity, rising inflation, and poor economic management exacerbated public discontent.

<sup>1</sup> Vidhura Thakin Chit Maung, *Lutlatye Yapyinauk Myanmar Pyi* (Myanmar After Independence), Yangon, Bagan Bookstore, 1969, p. 51

<sup>2</sup> Kyaw Nyein, 2021b (iii), 217

<sup>3</sup> "Federal Mu Hswe Nway Pwgyi Sa Pyi" (The Federal Debate Has Begun), *Hanthawaddy Newspaper*, 25 February 1962, p. 1

<sup>4</sup> Po Kyaw San, *Parliman Democracy Sanit Hnit Myanmar Naingngan* (Parliamentary Democracy and Myanmar), Yangon, Sanpya Press, 1970, p. 229

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Maung Maung, *Myanmar Naingnganye Khayee Hnit Bochokegyi Ne Win* (Myanmar Political Expedition and General Ne Win), Yangon, Bagan Library, 1968, page 423

### **Nationalist Sentiments**

1. **Ethnic and Nationalist Tensions:** The central government struggled to manage ethnic tensions and nationalist movements, which further destabilized the country and eroded trust in civilian leadership.

### **Military Motivation and Ideology**

1. **General Ne Win's Ambitions:** General Ne Win and the military leadership were driven by a combination of ideological beliefs. General Ne Win's vision of a Socialist Burma and his dissatisfaction with the political system motivated his actions.
2. **Military Doctrine:** The military's ideology, which emphasized stability and nationalism, justified their intervention as necessary to protect the country from perceived chaos and foreign influences.

### **Institutional and Structural Factors**

1. **Weak Democratic Institutions:** The lack of strong democratic institutions and a robust rule of law made the political system vulnerable to military intervention. The inability of civilian leaders to address crises effectively further facilitated the taking of power.

### **Lessons for Democratic Resilience**

1. **Vulnerability of Democracies:** The 1962 came to power highlights the vulnerability of democratic systems to military intervention, especially in the face of institutional weaknesses and socio-economic crises.
2. **Importance of Governance:** Effective governance and the maintenance of democratic institutions are crucial in preventing such come to powers and ensuring political stability.

## **Conclusion**

In Myanmar, the 1962 military rule led to significant political instability and ethnic conflicts, driven by a combination of economic mismanagement and institutional failures. The immediate consequence of the come to power was the dismantling of parliamentary democracy and the emergence of military rule. Additionally, the come to power had a profound impact on Myanmar's political, social, and economic development. An examination of these underlying causes reveals that the come to power was not a sudden event but rather a response to a complex interplay of national crises and the circumstances of the collapse of the Union. Understanding these factors provides valuable insights into the challenges Myanmar faces in its pursuit of stability and democratic governance.

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